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Summary
Many monkeys adopt abstract response strategies as
they learn to map visual symbols to responses by trial
and error. According to the repeat-stay strategy, if a
symbol repeats from a previous, successful trial, the
monkeys should stay with their most recent response
choice. According to the change-shift strategy, if the
symbol changes, the monkeys should shift to a dif-
ferent choice. We recorded the activity of prefrontal
cortex neurons while monkeys chose responses ac-
cording to these two strategies. Many neurons had
activity selective for the strategy used. In a subse-
quent block of trials, the monkeys learned fixed stim-
ulus-response mappings with the same stimuli. Some
neurons had activity selective for choosing responses
based on fixed mappings, others for choosing based
on abstract strategies. These findings indicate that
the prefrontal cortex contributes to the implementa-
tion of the abstract response strategies that monkeys
use during trial-and-error learning.
Introduction
In Words and Rules, Pinker (1999) explores the dichot-
omy between rote memorization and knowledge that
depends on rules. Memorization plays a central role in
associationist thought, including animal learning the-
ory, computations involving neural networks, and, most
generally, philosophical empiricism. Rules, strategies,
and other abstractions figure prominently in cognitive
neuroscience, computations involving symbols, and
philosophical rationalism. The interaction of—and the
tension between—exemplar-based, empirical knowl-
edge and abstract, theoretical knowledge plays a central
role in cognitive creativity.
In this neurophysiological study, monkeys made re-
sponse choices based on both exemplars and abstrac-
tions. At the exemplar level, a symbolic visual stimulus
appeared on each trial, and the monkeys chose a re-
sponse based on that symbol. Each of three symbols
instructed a different response, and the monkeys
learned each of these arbitrary stimulus-response map-
pings by trial and error. They could not, however, apply
this knowledge to novel stimuli. At the abstract level,
the monkeys learned two response strategies—called
repeat-stay and change-shift—and they could apply
these strategies to novel stimuli. In previous studies
(Bussey et al., 2001; Wise and Murray, 1999), some
monkeys have spontaneously adopted these strategies*Correspondence: stevenwise@mail.nih.govas they learned new stimulus-response mappings,
nearly doubling their reward rate in the earliest phases
of learning. Other monkeys have adopted one or nei-
ther strategy.
Parts of the prefrontal cortex (PF) play a necessary
role in the implementation of these and other strategies
(Bussey et al., 2001), yet little is known about their neu-
ral basis. PF has been viewed as a neural substrate for
rules and strategies in humans (Brass et al., 2003; Bunge,
2005; Bunge et al., 2003; Owen et al., 1990, 1996; Rob-
bins, 2000; Rushworth et al., 2002) and monkeys (Collins
et al., 1998; Gaffan et al., 2002), and previous neuro-
physiological studies of PF have found rule- and strat-
egy-related activity (Asaad et al., 2000; Barraclough et
al., 2004; Fuster et al., 2000; Hoshi et al., 2000; Wallis
and Miller, 2003b; White and Wise, 1999). However,
there have been no neurophysiological studies of the
strategies that monkeys spontaneously adopt as they
solve a cognitive problem such as learning arbitrary
pairings between symbols and responses. The present
study did so in order to test the hypothesis that neurons
in PF play an important role in implementing abstract
response strategies as well as exemplar-based re-
sponses.
Figure 1A shows the sequence and timing of events
for each trial. As the monkeys fixated a central light
spot, a visual instruction stimulus (IS) appeared at that
location, and three potential response targets appeared
elsewhere: left, up, and right from center. One IS was
selected on each trial from a set of three, and those
ISs differed from each other in color and shape. The
disappearance of the IS served as the signal for the
monkeys to choose a response target by making a sac-
cade to it.
The monkeys performed four tasks having this se-
quence of events, in separate blocks of w100 trials
each. While recording from a given group of neurons,
we usually began with the standard version of the strat-
egy task (Figure 1C), using novel ISs, followed by three
control tasks: a mapping task that used the same ISs;
a high-reward version of the strategy task, also using
the same ISs; and a mapping task that used highly fa-
miliar ISs, called the familiar mapping task.
As two rhesus monkeys performed these tasks, we
sampled the activity of single neurons in both the dor-
solateral part of PF (PFdl) and a dorsomedial part
(PFdm) (Figure 1B). The PFdl population was largely
confined to area 46, in the caudal half of the principal
sulcus. PFdm spanned three cytoarchitectonic regions:
homotypical area 9, dysgranular area 8, and a rostral
part agranular area 6, which is sometimes called pre-
PMd and is thought to be more closely allied with PF
than with motor cortex (Picard and Strick, 2001).
Results
Strategy Task: Standard Version
In the strategy task (Figure 1C), the monkeys re-
sponded to a set of three novel ISs according to the
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308Figure 1. Task Design and Recording Locations
(A) Sequence of task events. Gray rectangles represent the video screen, white squares show the three potential response targets (not to
scale), the white dot illustrates the fixation point, and the converging dashed lines indicate gaze angle. Disappearance of the instruction
stimulus was the trigger stimulus, after which the monkeys made a saccade (solid arrow) and maintained fixation at the chosen target. The
target squares then filled with white, and reinforcement (dotted arrow) was delivered, when appropriate.
(B) Penetration sites. Composite from both monkeys, relative to sulcal landmarks.
(C) Strategy task. Responses shown by the thick arrows in the middle column represent correct applications of the repeat-stay (pink back-
ground) or change-shift (blue background) strategies. + indicates a rewarded response; − an unrewarded response. If unrewarded, the
monkeys then got a second chance to respond and received reinforcement for choosing the saccade made least recently (right).
(D) Example sequence for the strategy task. The red circle and slash indicates a disallowed response CSh, change shift; RSt, repeat stay.repeat-stay and change-shift strategies. These strate- o
tgies depended on the fact that a second-chance pro-
cedure, explained below, ensured that the monkeys o
ended a series of trials with a rewarded response, in
effect “setting up” the next trial. On that next trial, if the f
pIS was the same as that on the previous trial (called a
repeat trial), then the monkeys should stay with their t
wprevious response to receive a reward. If the IS differed
from that on the previous trial (called a change trial), c
Dthen the monkeys should shift from their previous re-
sponse. Choice of one of the two potential shift re- b
sponses, randomly selected, would be rewarded. If a
monkey correctly shifted its response, but failed to re- a
aceive a reward, the same IS was presented on a series
of second-chance trials until it chose the remaining t
ashift response, which was rewarded (Figure 1C).
By design, the monkeys could not learn any fixed t
tstimulus-response mappings in the strategy task, and
Figure 1D shows why. In that example, after stimulus B
aon trial 1, the top choice was rewarded. When stimulus
B appeared on trial 2, it was a repeat trial, and the top r
tchoice was again rewarded. When stimulus B appearedn the trial 6, however, it was a change trial, and the
op choice was precluded because it had been chosen
n the previous trial.
Our analysis focused on task-related neurons, de-
ined as a significant difference in discharge rate, com-
ared to a reference period, in any of five task periods:
he IS1, IS2, reaction and movement time (RMT), prere-
ard, and postreward periods (see Experimental Pro-
edures and Figure 1A). Table S1 (see the Supplemental
ata online) presents the numbers of task-related cells
y task, monkey, and task period.
Overall, both monkeys performed the strategy task
t 96% correct (Figures 2A and 2B). Table S2 shows an
nalysis of error types, and Table S3 gives the reaction
imes, which did not differ significantly between repeat
nd change trials for either monkey. Table S4 shows
hat the saccades were highly accurate in both trial
ypes.
We examined whether activity differed significantly
ccording to the strategy used to choose a response:
epeat-stay versus change-shift. Figure 3 shows the ac-
ivity of two PF cells during the strategy task. After IS
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309Figure 2. Performance Curves
(A and B) Strategy task. (C and D) Mapping
task. (A and C) Monkey 1. (B and D) Monkey
2. The percentage of correct responses,
averaged over w130 problem sets, as a func-
tion of trial number. Blue curves show perfor-
mance on repeat trials. Green curves show
percentage of rewarded saccades, change tri-
als only. Background shading indicates 95%
confidence limits. Red curves show percen-
tage of saccades that were chosen according
to the change-shift strategy, change trials only.presentation, the cell illustrated in Figure 3A increased
its activity for both strategies at first, but after w125
ms the activity during repeat trials strongly exceeded
that during change trials. This activity decayed rapidly,
and in the IS2 period the cell’s preference switched
from a strong preference for the repeat-stay strategy to
a weak one for the change-shift strategy. The neuron
illustrated in Figure 3B showed a preference for the
change-shift strategy in both the IS1 and IS2 periods,
which began w120 ms after the appearance of the IS,
regardless of which IS appeared on that trial.
When statistically significant, we called such activity
contrasts strategy effects. Table 1 gives the numbers
of cells with significant strategy effects, based on
analysis of variance (ANOVA, α = 0.05). The ANOVA was
performed on neurons showing statistically significant
task-related activity and used three factors: Strategy,
IS, and Response choice. In the IS1 period, for exam-
ple, 428 of 700 neurons monitored during the strategy
task were task related in monkey 1, as were 479 of 731
neurons in monkey 2. Of these 907 task-related neu-
rons, there was a main strategy effect in 145 cells (16%)
and an interactive effect involving strategy in another
227 cells (25%), for a total of 41%. Table 1 presents
analogous data for the other periods. Table S5 and Fig-
ure S1 show a breakdown by monkey with the specific
interactive effects enumerated.
Almost half (46%) of the cells with a strategy effect
also showed either a main effect of Response choice,
a Strategy × Response choice interactive effect, or
both. This finding varied little by task period or by mon-
key: 43% (n = 145) in IS1, 45% (n = 152) in IS2, 52%
(n = 89) in RMT, 51% (n = 136) in prereward, and 42%(n = 113) in postreward. This finding shows that the
strategy effects do not result solely from high-level vi-
sual processing, such as the detection of stimulus
change or repetition, and Figure 4 illustrates an exam-
ple. This PF cell showed a strong selectivity for change
trials, but preferentially for choice of the top target.
Note also that it had response selectivity only for
change trials. Similarly, nearly one-third of the neurons
with strategy effects showed response selectivity only
for repeat trials or only for change trials (one-way
ANOVA, Bonferroni-corrected α = 0.025; see Table S6
for each task period).
Of the remaining cells (54%), which showed a strat-
egy effect but were not selective for the response, only
a few showed selectivity for the IS type: 20% (n = 91)
in IS1, 7% (n = 74) in IS2, 15% (n = 45) in RMT, 3% (n =
62) in prereward, and 7% (n = 67) in postreward. Thus,
stimulus coding was not a prominent feature of the pre-
sent results.
After establishing the significance of the strategy ef-
fect by ANOVA, we assessed its magnitude with a post
hoc analysis called the strategy-effect index (see Ex-
perimental Procedures). An Istrat of 0 indicated no activ-
ity difference between the strategies. In the IS period
(IS1 and IS2, combined), the mean |Istrat| was 0.31 ±
0.22 (SD) for monkey 1 and 0.38 ± 0.25 for monkey 2.
These values corresponded to an approximately 2-fold
difference in activity, on average, for the preferred strat-
egy over the nonpreferred one. Figures S3C, S3D, S4C,
and S4D show the distributions of Istrat in order to indi-
cate the overall magnitude of the strategy effect. Ap-
proximately one-half of the cells (50% and 57% in mon-
keys 1 and 2, respectively) exceeded a 2-fold activity
Neuron
310Figure 3. Strategy Effects
Example neuronal activity from two neurons:
(A) from the rostral part of PFdm, (B) from
PFdl. The saccade directions are shown by
the arrows. The squares on each line of the
raster show the time that the trigger stimulus
occurred; each dot corresponds to the time
of a neuronal action potential. The back-
ground shading identifies the task periods.
The cell in (A) had much greater activity for
repeat trials (black) than for change trials
(red) in the IS1 period, regardless of stimulus
or saccade direction. The cell in (B) had the
opposite preference and also showed some
preference for responses to the left.difference between strategies (|Istrat| = 0.33), and ap- f
tproximately one-quarter (19% and 28% in monkeys 1
and 2, respectively) exceeded a 4-fold difference p
t(|Istrat| = 0.6). When the designation of change or repeat
trial was randomly shuffled 100 times, a mean |Istrat| of s
a0.11 was obtained for both monkeys, corresponding to
a ratio of only 1.25:1. p
aWe also quantified the strength of the strategy effect
by computing receiver operating characteristic (ROC) w
svalues for each PF neuron, using the mean firing rates
across the IS period. The ROC values depended on the a
idegree of overlap between two distributions of activity
levels, but not a cell’s overall activity, its level of refer- u
uence-period activity, or its dynamic range. The ROC
curves were based on each observed discharge rate −5.87, p < 0.0001, n = 700) and monkey 2 (Z = −7.44, p <
Table 1. Strategy Effects
Factors IS1 IS2 RMT Prereward Postreward
Strategy 145 (16%) 152 (20%) 89 (12%) 136 (16%) 113 (13%)
IS 105 (12%) 82 (11%) 72 (9%) 53 (6%) 56 (6%)
Choice 156 (17%) 141 (18%) 129 (17%) 209 (25%) 122 (14%)
Strategy, incl. interactive 372 (41%) 288 (38%) 263 (34%) 309 (37%) 264 (30%)
n 907 766 765 825 867
Cells showing a significant effect of strategy (three-way ANOVA, p < 0.05), IS, or choice (i.e., saccade direction). Both monkeys, combined.
Task periods are defined in Experimental Procedures and illustrated in Figure 1A. Top three rows: numbers (and percentages of n, bottom
row) of neurons with a significant main effect of each row’s factor. Fourth row: numbers (and percentages) of neurons with either main or
interactive effects involving strategy. Table S5 shows these data by monkey and the specific interactive terms, and Figure S1 illustrates
these data.or each neuron. We plotted the proportion of change
rials with activity that exceeded that rate against the
roportion of repeat trials that did so. The area under
his ROC curve thus served as a measure of strategy
electivity: a value of 0.5 corresponded to no selectivity,
value of 1.0 (never observed) corresponded to a com-
lete lack of overlap of the distributions. The ROC
nalysis confirmed that the cells were selective for
hich strategy the monkeys used on a trial-by-trial ba-
is (Figure 5). Using a bootstrapping method (see Wallis
nd Miller, 2003b), random shuffling of the strategy des-
gnations 1000 times for each neuron yielded ROC val-
es that were significantly less than the observed val-
es for both monkey 1 (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, Z =
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311Figure 4. Cell Showing that the Strategy Ef-
fect Does Not Simply Reflect Detection of
Whether the IS Repeats from Trial to Trial
Format as in Figure 3. (A) Change trials. (B)
Repeat trials. Note selectivity for change tri-
als, but only for upward (top row) and (to a
lesser extent) leftward responses (middle
row).0.0001, n = 750). The median ROC value was 0.63 in
monkey 1 and 0.60 in Monkey 2, values that, along with
their distribution, can be compared with those obtained
in other studies (see Discussion).
No dramatic differences were observed among task
periods in the frequency of strategy effects. The strat-
egy preference (for the change-shift or the repeat-stay
strategy) and the magnitude of the strategy effects also
differed little by task period (Figures S3C, S3D, S4C,
and S4D). Taken together, the existence of highly signif-
icant strategy effects, some of which depended on the
response chosen on a particular trial, and the high
magnitude of the effects support the hypothesis that
PF neurons contribute importantly to the implementa-
tion of these abstract response strategies. This point is
taken up in the Discussion.
Familiar Mapping Control Task
To rule out the possibility that trial-to-trial changes in
the IS or in the response choice accounted for the strat-
egy effects, we tested for similar activity contrasts in
the familiar mapping task. In this task, the monkeys re-
sponded to highly familiar ISs according to three well-learned stimulus-response mappings. The familiar map-
ping task involved the same sequence of events as did
the strategy task (Figure 1A), and both monkeys per-
formed at >99% correct.
Cells showing statistically significant activity differ-
ences between repeat-trial and change-trial activity
were considered false-positive strategy effects be-
cause the monkeys were unlikely to be using either the
repeat-stay or change-shift strategy while responding
according to overlearned stimulus-response mappings.
For three task periods, the RMT, prereward, and postre-
ward period, these false-positive results occurred at
the level expected by chance (4%–6%, with α = 0.05,
ANOVA). For example, of the 23 cells showing a signifi-
cant strategy effect during the RMT period, only 4% (1
cell) showed a significant “strategy effect” in this task.
In the IS1 period, this proportion was somewhat higher:
of the 47 PF cells with strategy effects in the standard
version of the task, 15% (7 cells) appeared to retain this
property in the familiar mapping task; in the IS2 period,
26% did so. The ISs differed in the strategy and famil-
iar-mapping task, but virtually identical results were
found when excluding cells with stimulus selectivity.
Neuron
312Figure 5. ROC Plots
Colors show the area under the ROC curve for each individual cell, ranked according to the time at which this signal develops after stimulus
onset. (A) All neurons in monkey 2. (B) Neurons with an ROC value >0.6 for four consecutive bins and a preference for the repeat-stay strategy.
(C) As in (B), but with a preference for the change-shift strategy. (D and E) Data from (C) and (B), respectively, with a color scale approximating
that used by Wallis and Miller (2003b). (F and G) ROC plots from monkey 1 in the format of (D) and (E).These data show that an account of strategy effects in t
cterms of a change or repetition of either the stimulus or
ethe response choice can be rejected for the vast major-
tity of neurons with strategy effects (74%–96%, depend-
ring on the task period). Nevertheless, the higher of
sthese values (15% and 26%) indicates that some of the
cstrategy effects observed during the IS period could
areflect changes in either the IS or in the response
choice from trial to trial. Perhaps this finding reflects
rthe monkeys’ long experience with detecting IS repeats
sand changes while performing the strategy task. At
Otimes more remote from the IS and closer to the re-
Msponse, this property seems to be completely absent.
p
p
Reward-Expectation Control: High-Reward o
Version of the Strategy Task t
As an important feature of the experimental design, the l
monkeys’ reward rates differed between change trials i
and repeat trials. In the standard version of the strategy c
task, each correct application of the change-shift strat- s
egy resulted in a reward rate of 50% on first-chance (
trials. In the high-reward version of the task, this reward m
rate was 90%, which approximated that for repeat trials c
in both versions of the strategy task. e
In monkeys 1 and 2, respectively, we recorded from T
247 and 290 PF cells in both versions of the strategyask. Figures 6A and 6B show an example of such a
omparison in one PF neuron. For that cell, the differ-
nce in reward prediction between repeat and change
rials could not account for the strategy effect: reward
ate did not affect the cell’s preference for the change-
hift task. The present analysis includes all task-related
ells with more than 15 correctly executed repeat trials
nd the same minimum number of change trials.
Notwithstanding the example in Figures 6A and 6B,
eward-prediction effects were observed, as in previous
tudies of PF (Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Roesch and
lson, 2004; Tremblay and Schultz, 2000; Wallis and
iller, 2003a; Watanabe et al., 2002). We intend to re-
ort these data elsewhere in more detail, but for the
resent report we performed several analyses to rule
ut the possibility that strategy effects depended en-
irely on reward prediction or related factors. We se-
ected cells that showed a significant strategy effect
n the standard version of the task and calculated the
orrelation of Istrat in the high-reward and standard ver-
ions. For the IS1 period, this correlation was ρ = 0.73
n = 46 cells), which was statistically significant (Spear-
an correlation, p < 0.001). This strong correlation indi-
ated that the strategy effect was similar in both prefer-
nce and magnitude for the two levels of reward tested.
he analogous correlation was ρ = 0.73 (n = 47 cells, p <0.001) for the IS2 period, ρ = 0.62 (n = 27 cells, p <
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313Figure 6. Cell Preferring the Change-Shift
Strategy and Lacking a Major Influence of
Reward Prediction
From PFdl. (A) Standard version of the strat-
egy task, with correct change-shift choices
rewarded at a 50% rate. (B) High-reward ver-
sion of the task, using the same stimulus set,
with correct change-shift choices rewarded
at a 90% rate to more closely match the re-
ward rate for repeat trials. (C) Comparison of
the strategy score and the reward-prediction
score. Percent of cells with activity better
matching reward probability (blue) or strat-
egy (magenta). CSh, change-shift; IS1, early
instruction-stimulus period; IS2, late instruc-
tion-stimulus period; rew, reward; RMT, reac-
tion and movement-time period.0.001) for the RMT period, and ρ = 0.58 (n = 45 cells, p <
0.001) for the prereward period. We also found that 43
of 46 cells (93%) with a significant strategy effect in the
standard version of the task maintained their strategy
preference in the high-reward version (binomial test,
p < 0.001), despite the fact that the difference in reward
rate between repeat and change trials was very small
in the high-reward version. The other task periods had
similar results: 43/47 (96%) in IS2, 25/27 (93%) in RMT,
and 35/45 (78%) in the prereward period. Furthermore,
bootstrapping methods showed that most cells with
strategy effects lacked any significant activity differ-
ence for their preferred strategy in the high-reward ver-
sus standard version of the task: 26 of 46 (57%) in the
IS1 period, 28 of 47 (60%) in IS2, 18 of 27 (67%) in RMT,
and 29 of 45 (64%) in the prereward period. In addition
to those tests, we calculated a reward-prediction score,
which was based on whether the reward rate was near90% or near 50% on a series of trial types across the
various strategy and mapping tasks and whether a
cell’s activity corresponded to those levels. We com-
pared that score to a strategy-score, which was based
on the strategy used in the relevant trial types (see text
above Figure S2 for these methods in more detail).
Many PF neurons reflected the strategy used to a
greater extent than the probability of reward (Figure 6C;
Figure S2). These analyses did not rule out an effect of
reward prediction in some PF neurons, but did exclude
an account of PF’s strategy effects solely in those
terms.
Mapping Task
We also compared PF’s neuronal activity in the map-
ping task versus the strategy task. In the mapping task
(Figure 7D), the monkeys learned three novel mappings
of the same type as in the familiar mapping task. At the
Neuron
314Figure 7. Cell Preferring the Mapping Task
This neuron was located in PFdm (see Figure
1B). (A), (B), and (C) each show neuronal ac-
tivity relative to the onset of the instruction
stimulus. Neuronal activity averages: red for
the mapping task, black for the strategy
task. (D) Three ISs, with arrows indicating
the correct action for each. (E) Percent of
cells by task period showing a task effect,
for each monkey. rew, reward.beginning of a block of trials, all three mappings were t
funknown, although the ISs were the same as in the just-
completed block of trials on the standard version of the F
astrategy task. Then the monkeys learned, by trial and
error, which one of the three targets to choose in re- b
asponse to each IS. Reward followed each correct
choice, and the absence of reward provided error feed-
tback. After each incorrect choice, the same IS ap-
peared on consecutive second-chance trials until the s
Tmonkey chose correctly.
The monkeys learned novel mappings very quickly s
f(green curves in Figures 2C and 2D), but during the
early trials in a block, prior to learning the fixed stimu- n
clus-response mappings, the monkeys used the repeat-
stay and change-shift strategies. This finding is demon- t
sstrated by the fact that, after a correct response, the
monkeys managed scores of >80% correct for repeat e
strials (blue curves in Figures 2C and 2D), from the be-
ginning of the mapping block. With the exception of s
(trial 2 in monkey 1, they also correctly shifted their re-
sponses on >90% of change trials (red curves). Be- w
ccause the monkeys used these strategies, data from
these early trials were discarded for the analysis de- B
mscribed below, which contrasts activity in the strategy
and mapping tasks. Table S2 shows each monkey’s C
Spercentage of correct responses. Reaction times forhe strategy versus mapping task (Table S3) did not dif-
er significantly for either monkey, with one exception.
or change trials, monkey 1 had significantly faster re-
ction times in the strategy task (t = 6.4, p < 0.001),
ut the neurophysiological results were unlikely to be
ffected by this 10 ms difference in reaction time.
Except for the existence of the fixed mappings of IS
o response choice, the mapping task matched the
trategy task in event sequence and timing (Figure 1A).
his comparison served to control for low-order sen-
ory and motor factors. Thus, we took advantage of the
act that the mapping task provided us with an opportu-
ity to compare PF activity when the monkey made pre-
isely the same saccade to precisely the same spatial
arget in response to precisely the same, foveally pre-
ented and attended stimulus. In the mapping task,
ach IS was associated with one and only one re-
ponse choice. In the example illustrated in Figure 7C,
timulus C instructed a saccade to the right target
C/right). In the strategy task, that IS-response pair
as selected from among the two other pairs that oc-
urred for saccades to the right target (A/right and
/right). There were three such pairs common to the
apping and strategy tasks, A/top, B/left, and
/right, selected from nine pairs in the strategy task.
uch a comparison eliminated any simple sensory or
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315motor factors that might have affected neuronal ac-
tivity.
For 383 and 499 PF neurons in monkeys 1 and 2,
respectively, we collected sufficient data to compare
the discharge rates in the strategy and mapping tasks.
These comparisons required at least five correctly exe-
cuted trials in both tasks for all three IS/response
pairs. Of these 882 neurons, 532 showed significant
task-related activity. After eliminating the 15% of the
population that showed a significant between-task dif-
ference in reference-period activity, there remained
w240 task-related neurons in each task period: 253 in
IS1, 226 in IS2, 243 in RMT, 246 in prereward, and 224
in postreward. Task effects, defined as statistically sig-
nificant activity differences between the mapping task
and the standard version of the strategy task, were then
identified by ANOVA (α = 0.05). Figures 7A–7C illustrate
the activity of a PF neuron showing a task effect. This
neuron had two kinds of tuning. First, and most con-
ventionally, the cell showed a preference for the trials
involving rightward responses (Figure 7C). Second,
however, this neuron had much greater activity for the
mapping task (red) when a given IS instructed that re-
sponse due to a fixed mapping compared to when that
same IS guided the same response based on an ab-
stract strategy (black).
Of the task-related neurons tested, w30% showed a
significant task effect, varying from 36% in the IS2
period (82/226) to 26% in the RMT period (62/243). Fig-
ure 7E and Table S7 give the breakdown by monkey
and task period. In the IS1 period, 57% of these cells
had greater modulation in the mapping task; in the IS2
period, 46% did so; and in the later task periods (RMT,
prereward, and postreward), 66% preferred the map-
ping task (both monkeys, combined). We measured the
magnitude of the task effect using a task-effect index
Itask. Figures S3A, S3B, S4A, and S4B show the distribu-
tion of Itask across the population of cells for each
period. There were no dramatic differences in task pref-
erence (strategy versus mapping task) or the magni-
tude of the task effects.
We did not observe any noteworthy anatomical distri-
butions of task or strategy effects or preferences (Fig-
ures S5 and S6).
Discussion
We studied PF activity as monkeys responded to sym-
bolic visual cues according to two abstract strategies,
called repeat-stay and change-shift. In separate blocks
of trials, they learned and responded according to
memorized stimulus-response mappings. We chose to
study the repeat-stay and change-shift strategies be-
cause other monkeys have spontaneously adopted
them while learning stimulus-response mappings (Wise
and Murray, 1999). The present monkeys did so as well.
Previous work has shown that parts of PF play a neces-
sary role in the implementation of these and other stra-
tegies (Bussey et al., 2001), and the present results re-
veal important insights into their neural basis.
Successful implementation of these strategies re-
quired several cognitive processes and their coordina-
tion. To perform the task successfully, the monkeys hadto (1) remember the spatial target (or saccade) most
recently chosen (a spatial memory), (2) remember the
stimulus (or stimulus-response pair) preceding that
choice (a nonspatial memory), (3) use the nonspatial
memory to evaluate whether the stimulus on the current
trial had changed from the previous trial, and (4) use
the spatial memory to choose the same target when
the stimulus repeated and to reject that target when the
stimulus changed.
We hypothesized that neurons in PF played an impor-
tant role in implementing abstract response strategies,
as well as exemplar-based responses. Their properties
were consistent with that hypothesis and with each of
the four cognitive processes enumerated above. We do
not report here the well-known spatial and nonspatial
memory signals observed in PF neurons (Rainer et al.,
1998), which correspond to processes 1 and 2 listed
above. We observed those signals in the present data
and will describe them in a subsequent report. Unique
to the present task, we found that many PF neurons
were selective for either the repeat-stay or change-shift
strategy, but showed no selectivity for the particular re-
sponse chosen. These characteristics coincide with
one or more aspects of process 3 above: the evaluation
of stimulus repetition or change, recall of the correct
strategy, and implementation of that strategy. In many
of the PF cells, however, the strategy-related activity
was specific for a particular response choice. For ex-
ample, some cells had selectivity for trials that involved
responses to the top target after the stimulus had
changed (Figure 4). Such findings rule out an account
of the strategy effects solely in terms of high-level vi-
sion (cognitive process 3) and point to a role in process
4: the selection of a response based on stimulus repeti-
tion or change. Neurons with strategy effects selective
for a particular target could perform a computation that
bridges the gap from the repeat-change evaluation to
the selection of the upcoming response target.
Previous Neurophysiological Studies
The evaluation of whether the stimulus had repeated or
changed from the previous trial resembles a matching
rule. Match (or nonmatch) signals have been reported
in PF previously, but relatively rarely. For example,
Miller et al. (1996) found that only a minority of PF cells
conveyed pure “match” information. Instead, the major-
ity (65%) of cells with activity indicative of matches
were also stimulus selective. In contrast, our cells with
strategy effects showed a much smaller proportion of
stimulus selectivity (20% in the IS1 period, less in other
task periods). Along with the response selectivity of
many cells with strategy effects (Figure 4), this finding
points to a role beyond stimulus identification or the
detection of stimulus repetition to a more-general role
in the implementation of the change-shift or repeat-
stay strategy.
In addition, the strategy task differed importantly
from such matching tasks. The strategy task combined
a match/nonmatch rule with the need to maintain a
short-term memory of the previous response, as well
as with the use of the match/nonmatch decision to
choose a response based on that memory. This require-
ment contrasts with a traditional matching task, in
Neuron
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tsion based on long-term memory. For example, mon-
keys often release a bar if they detect a match (Wallis
tet al., 2001; Wallis and Miller, 2003b). The greater load
on short-term memory in the present task may account, e
cin part, for the strong strategy selectivity that we ob-
served, compared to the degree of rule selectivity ob- s
tserved by Wallis and Miller. Such comparisons have
problems, of course, but comparing our data with theirs (
Rhas some strengths as well. We used the same cell se-
lection strategy; neither they nor we searched for and f
gisolated task-related neurons. Although their analysis
involved a different number of trials per cell (300–400 s
Gper rule) than ours (30–100 per strategy), because we
moved our electrodes more often, we studied the same
tgeneral regions within PF, and both analyses used a
200 ms window advanced in steps of 10 ms. According o
lto the present ROC analysis (Figure 5), PF neurons re-
flected the repeat-stay and change-shift strategies M
tmore strongly than PF the neurons studied by Wallis
and Miller reflected matching and nonmatching rules s
t(compare Figures 5D–5G with Figure 7 of Wallis and
Miller, 2003b). For monkey 1, the median ROC value
was higher in the current data than in theirs (0.63 versus S
0.57), as was the upper interquartile range (IQR) (0.68 T
versus 0.62). For monkey 2, a similar difference was h
observed for the median (0.60 versus 0.57) and upper m
IQR (0.66 versus 0.62). The difference between the two r
data sets was highly significant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov t
two-sample test, two-sided, D = 0.25, n = 567, m = 700, t
p < 0.0001 for monkey 1; D = 0.20, n = 567, m = 751, a
p < 0.0001 for monkey 2). Furthermore, only 5% of the f
sample collected by Wallis and Miller showed ROC val- t
ues in excess of 0.7 for their rules, whereas 21% of the s
sample in monkey 1 and 17% in monkey 2 did so for m
our strategies. Although the number of trials differed, t
this should have increased the noise in our sample and c
thus decreased our ROC values, yet the observed ROC v
values in our task were significantly higher. The strategy h
selectivity during the IS period was also higher than 2
their median ROC value (0.52) for rule selectivity in the R
test phase, which did not differ significantly from 2
chance level. f
Other studies have also reported PF activity related 2
to rules and strategies. A representation of rules was t
found for location-matching and shape-matching rules m
(Hoshi et al., 2000). One previous study compared neu-
ronal activity for spatial, object, and associative rules I
and found many cells with activity that reflected each A
rule, even though the stimuli and response did not differ s
(Asaad et al., 2000). Other studies have compared arbi- c
trary response rules with spatial ones (Fuster et al., h
2000; White and Wise, 1999), and some have concen- t
trated on visuospatial “rules” (Zhang et al., 1997), al- r
though the relationship of such spatial remapping rules c
to the abstract and symbolic rules studied here remains c
unclear. Barraclough et al. (2004) studied win-stay and c
lose-shift strategies. (Note that the current monkeys’ c
change-shift strategy, which followed reward, differed R
importantly from their monkeys’ lose-shift strategy, S
which followed nonreward.) Barraclough et al. found t
that signals related to the animal’s past choices and s
stheir outcomes were combined in PF neurons, suggest-ng a role of PF in optimizing decision-making stra-
egies.
We do not mean to imply that PF is the only part of
he brain that contributes to rules and strategies. For
xample, the posterior parietal cortex has been impli-
ated in related functions (Stoet and Snyder, 2004), and
tudies on patients with Parkinson’s disease implicate
he basal ganglia in rule- and strategy-based behavior
Cools et al., 2004; Shohamy et al., 2004; Swainson and
obbins, 2001). Furthermore, interactions between in-
erotemporal cortex and PF play a crucial role in rule-
uided behavior, when these rules depend on non-
patial visual inputs (Gaffan et al., 2002; Parker and
affan, 1998).
The present study differed from previous ones in that
he specific response strategies studied here were the
nes that some monkeys adopt spontaneously as they
earn symbolic stimulus-response mappings (Wise and
urray, 1999). Of course, when the monkeys performed
he strategy task here, they did not use those strategies
pontaneously, a topic taken up below in Interpreta-
ional Issues.
tudies in Humans
he involvement of PF in the use of different strategies
as been supported by neuroimaging studies, as sum-
arized by Bunge (2005), and in studies of event-
elated potentials (Folstein and Van Petten, 2004). Huet-
el and McCarthy (2004), for example, used a variant of
he oddball task and found an increase of activity in PF
ssociated with dynamic changes in response strategy
rom a default “positional strategy,” in which the posi-
ion of the target guides the movement, to a “shape
trategy,” in which the shape of the stimulus guides the
ovement. Huettel and Misiurek (2004) found that ac-
ivity in PF reflected the number of response rules ex-
luded by a stimulus. The present findings have pro-
ided support for those results and others from both
umans (Brass et al., 2003; Bunge, 2005; Bunge et al.,
003; Owen et al., 1990, 1996; Rogers et al., 1998;
ushworth et al., 2002) and monkeys (Asaad et al.,
000; Barraclough et al., 2004; Collins et al., 1998; Gaf-
an et al., 2002; Hoshi et al., 2000; Wallis and Miller,
003b; White and Wise, 1999; Wise and Murray, 1999)
hat point to a role for PF in the selection and imple-
entation of rules and strategies.
nterpretational Problems and Limitations
bove, we ruled out interpretations of strategy effects
olely in terms of evaluating whether the stimulus had
hanged or repeated. The fact that many PF neurons
ave activity that is selective for either repeat or change
rials, but preferentially when the monkeys choose (or
eject) a particular response, shows that such an ac-
ount is inadequate. A different subpopulation of PF
ells, however, may play a role in detecting stimulus
hange and repetition, as discussed above. Here we
onsider other alternative interpretations.
esponse Change
ome frontal activity reflects response changes from
rial to trial (Matsuzaka and Tanji, 1996). But a compari-
on of activity in the familiar mapping task versus the
trategy task shows that, for the majority of the cells,
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317changing the forthcoming response from trial to trial
could not have accounted for the strategy effects.
Attention
Many studies of PF have pointed to a role in top-down
control of attention, including those based on neuro-
psychological (Koski and Petrides, 2002; Rueckert and
Grafman, 1996; Stuss et al., 1999), neuroimaging (Ca-
beza and Nyberg, 2000; Corbetta et al., 1993; Pessoa
et al., 2003; Thiel et al., 2004; Woldorff et al., 2004),
and neurophysiological (Lebedev et al., 2004) methods.
However, because both strategies (change-shift and re-
peat-stay) and tasks (strategy and mapping) required
that the monkeys attended to the nonspatial features
of the IS, selective attention per se could not have ac-
counted for strategy or task effects. But this argument
does not exclude the possibility that strategy effects
mainly occurred when the monkey attended to whether
the stimulus had changed or repeated from trial to trial.
This idea limits the interpretability of task effects (con-
trasts between the mapping and strategy tasks), but
not that of strategy effects (contrasts between the re-
peat-stay and change-shift strategies). Abstract atten-
tional factors associated with the repeat-change eval-
uation were the same for all trials in the strategy task
and thus could not have accounted for strategy effects
or preferences.
Low-Order Sensory and Motor Factors
When we compared activity in the strategy and map-
ping tasks, we restricted the analysis to a comparison
of identical responses (the three saccades) and iden-
tical stimuli, all of which occurred within spatial coordi-
nate frames that were the identical in eye-centered,
head-centered, body-centered, and extrinsic coordi-
nates. Accordingly, our experimental design and analy-
sis ruled out simple motor, sensory, or spatial factors
as accounting for the task effects. ANOVA revealed that
such low-order factors could not account for strategy
effects, either.
Task Difficulty
The proportion of correct responses was nearly the
same across strategies and tasks, which indicated that
the monkeys found them of approximately the same
difficulty (95%–99% correct). Reaction time measures
should also be sensitive to task difficulty, and we found
nothing in those data that could account for the neu-
ronal activity contrasts observed in this experiment.
Reward Expectation
Previous studies have reported that reward expectation
affects PFdl activity (Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Roesch
and Olson, 2004; Wallis and Miller, 2003a; Watanabe et
al., 2002). We confirmed the existence of these signals
in PFdl and PFdm, but they could not have accounted
for either the strategy or task effects reported here. The
differential activity between repeat and change trials
was maintained in the high-reward version of the task,
although the difference in reward expectation between
these types of trials was minimal. With few exceptions,
changing the reward expectation did not change the
preference for repeat-stay and change-shift strategies.
Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies in which
the expectation of a larger reward correlated with
greater activity (Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Roesch and
Olson, 2004), the present task revealed a different rela-
tionship. In the standard version of the strategy task,the change-shift strategy was associated with a lower
rate of reward than the repeat-stay strategy, but as
many cells preferred the former as the latter.
Short-Term Memory
The repeat-stay or change-shift strategies required an
assessment of whether the stimulus had repeated from
the previous trial. Both strategies therefore necessi-
tated the maintenance of short-term, working memo-
ries, which had to persist over the intertrial interval and
beyond. Once thought to represent PF’s exclusive or
main function (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1987), the work-
ing-memory theory has failed to account for several key
observations made recently (Lebedev et al., 2004; Pet-
rides, 2000; Rowe and Passingham, 2001; Rushworth
et al., 1997). Nevertheless, PF does contribute to short-
term, working memory, as one among its many func-
tions. Although memory-related signals were observed
(and will be described in a subsequent report), the
strategy effects reported here could not have de-
pended on short-term memory because the repeat and
change trials had no differences in memory load or
content. Task effects, however, could have been influ-
enced by the requirement for remembering the most
recent IS and response in the strategy task, but not in
the mapping task.
Training a Strategy
The monkeys were operantly conditioned to apply the
strategies that monkeys we have studied in the past
have adopted spontaneously. Perhaps monkeys that
have received such conditioning adopt “abnormal”
variants of these strategies. Against this possibility, the
data shown in Figure 2 closely resembled those ob-
served previously (Bussey et al., 2001; Murray et al.,
2000; Wise and Murray, 1999). The present monkeys
also applied the repeat-stay and change-shift strate-
gies very effectively at the beginning of learning new
mappings, and their performance on those trials resem-
bled that in the strategy task. It remains possible, how-
ever, that they used different neural mechanisms in dif-
ferent blocks of trials.
Conclusions
We emphasized above that we do not mean to imply
that PF is the only part of the brain with neurons that
contribute to the implementation of abstract response
rules and strategies. Nor do we mean to imply that its
neurons are limited to such functions. What, then, do
PF neurons do? Our answer is that they participate in
most, if not all, of the cognitive functions important to
the life of primates, including categorization of events
and stimuli (Freedman et al., 2001, 2002, 2003), predic-
tion of forthcoming events (Rainer et al., 1999), task se-
lection (Asaad et al., 2000; Hoshi et al., 1998), top-down
attention (Lebedev et al., 2004; Miller et al., 1996), and
sequencing events and actions (Averbeck et al., 2002;
Hoshi and Tanji, 2004; Ninokura et al., 2003, 2004;
Quintana and Fuster, 1999), among other cognitive
functions. Some experts maintain that PF functions in
general intelligence, implying that it contributes to
problem solving whenever those problems exceed rou-
tine levels of difficulty (Duncan et al., 1996; Duncan and
Owen, 2000; Gaffan, 2002). Others maintain that PF or
parts of it function to monitor information in short-term
Neuron
318amemory, including plans and intentions (Lau et al.,
(2004; Owen et al., 1996; Petrides et al., 2002; Rowe et
tal., 2002; Rowe and Passingham, 2001), as well as
t
actively maintaining that information (Goldman-Rakic, c
1987). s
MThese ideas are not incompatible. The idea that PF
aneurons function in all of the behaviors important to
kthe cognitive life of primates lacks the appeal of some
ssimpler notions, but we think that the evidence indi-
w
cates that this is “what PF neurons do.” Following Pas- e
singham and his colleagues, it seems likely that the t
ifunctions of PF neurons can be expressed most suc-
acinctly in terms of “attentional selection” of responses
p(Rowe and Passingham, 2001), which involves, at a
minimum, top-down biasing of inputs to PF, integration
Sof information about context, mapping context to a po-
U
tential action or goal, competition among potential ac- e
tions or goals based on predicted outcomes, choosing e
an action or goal appropriate to the current context, s
actively maintaining that context and those choices in
Amemory—perhaps along with some alternatives—and
Wupdating all of the foregoing based on changing con-
otexts. Response choices based on abstract strategies
8
require each of these processes, and PF probably con- o




We studied two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), 8.8 kg (
and 7.7 kg. They sat in a primate chair, with their heads fixed, and s
faced a video monitor 32 cm away. All procedures conformed with s
the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (1996, ISBN i
0-309-05377-3) and were approved by the NIMH IACUC. c
r
oRecording Methods and Apparatus
lWe monitored eye position with an infrared oculometer (Bouis In-
sstruments, Karlsruhe, Germany). Single-unit potentials were iso-
lated with quartz-insulated platinum-iridium electrodes (80 m
iouter diameter; impedance, 0.5–1.5 M at 1 KHz) advanced by a
m16 electrode microdrive (Thomas Recording, Giessen, Germany)
athrough a custom, concentric recording head with 518 m
telectrode spacing. These highly selective electrodes recorded
tspike potentials over a range of only a few hundred micrometers,
owhich precludes recording a neuron’s activity on two or more
2electrodes. The signal from each electrode was discriminated
ceither online using a Multi Spike Detector (Alpha-Omega Engineer-
aing, Nazareth, Israel) or a Multichannel Acquisition Processor
o(Plexon, Dallas, TX) or offline. Every unit’s isolation was scrutinized
aoffline using Off Line Sorter (Plexon), and we accepted only indivi-
edual spike waveforms that clustered clearly in 3D principal-compo-
pnent space, lacked interspike intervals <1 ms, had waveforms
tgrouped tightly with other spikes in the time domain, and had sta-
pble and clearly differentiated waveforms over the course of the re-
Acordings. We recorded an average of 6.8 and 4.9 cells per electrode
Apenetration in monkeys 1 and 2, respectively (1–1.5 cells simulta-
neously), for electrodes that isolated at least one cell’s activity.
cCORTEX (http://www.cortex.salk.edu/) controlled behavior and col-
mlected data; MatOFF (http://dally.nimh.nih.gov/matoff/matoff.html),




A trial began when a 0.7° white circle—the fixation spot—appeared
at the center of the video screen (Figure 1A), along with the pre- H
Nsentation of three potential saccade targets (2.2° unfilled white
squares), 14° left, right, and up from center. The monkeys main- l
ltained fixation on the fixation spot (±7.5°) for 1.0 s. Then, the fixa-
tion spot disappeared and a visual instruction stimulus appeared bt the same location for a variable delay period of 1.0, 1.5, or 2.0 s
pseudorandomly selected). Each IS comprised two ASCII charac-
ers, superimposed as illustrated in Figure 6. We made no attempt
o determine which features of the stimuli were responsible for a
ell’s activity because previous work has shown that such complex
timuli elicit robust activity from PF neurons (Asaad et al., 2000;
iller et al., 1996), which sufficed for the present purpose. The dis-
ppearance of the IS served as the trigger stimulus. Next, the mon-
eys had to make a saccade to one of the three targets within 2.0
and fixate it (±6.7°) for 1.0 s. Then, all three targets filled with
hite, and, if appropriate, a 0.1 ml drop of fluid reward was deliv-
red 0.5 s later. The targets disappeared from the screen at that
ime, on both rewarded and unrewarded trials, and a 2.5 s intertrial
nterval began. After an unrewarded response, the monkeys had
n unlimited number of second-chance trials, which the monkeys
erformed until they made a correct response.
urgery
sing aseptic techniques and isofluorane anesthesia (1%–3%, to
ffect), a 27 × 36 mm recording chamber was implanted over the
xposed dura mater of the right frontal lobe, along with head re-
traint devices.
nalytical Methods
e quantified activity in specific task periods: a reference period
f 1000 ms during fixation and prior to the IS, an IS1 period from
0–400 ms after IS onset, an IS2 period from 400–1000 ms after IS
nset (i.e., until TS onset), a reaction and movement time (RMT)
eriod from TS onset until saccade termination, a prereward period
f 420 ms before the reward, and a postreward period of 220 ms
fter it (Figure 1A).
To examine strategy effects, we used correctly executed trials.
or all task-related neurons, we performed a three-way ANOVA
p < 0.05) with factors Strategy (repeat-stay, change-shift), Re-
ponse choice (left, right, up), and Stimulus (three levels). To mea-
ure the size of the strategy effect, we calculated a strategy-effect
ndex Istrat = (AC – AR)/(AC + AR), where AC was activity during the
hange trials and AR was that during repeat trials. The size and
eliability of the strategy effect was also measured with a receiver
perating characteristic (ROC) analysis (Green, 1966). We calcu-
ated ROC values in 200 ms bins from 500 ms before the IS pre-
entation until the TS, advancing in 10 or 20 ms steps.
To test for task selectivity, we selected the stimuli and responses
n the strategy task that matched those used in the corresponding
apping task. This analysis involved only correctly executed trials
nd excluded second-chance trials. We also eliminated the first ten
rials for each stimulus-response pair in each block of the mapping
ask. Thus, the activity changes accompanying the steepest phase
f the learning curve could not contribute to any task effect (Figure
). (For the postreward period, we also excluded unrewarded
hange trials.) For each neuron sampled, we identified task-related
ctivity by contrasting the reference period with that in each of the
ther task periods (Mann-Whitney U test; p < 0.05), and, when the
ctivity passed that test in a given task period, we tested for differ-
nces between strategy trials and mapping trials (one-way ANOVA,
< 0.05). Occasionally, a Mann-Whitney U test (p < 0.05) substi-
uted for ANOVA, when the latter was inappropriate due to com-
lete inactivity in one of the tasks. The task-effect index Itask = (AS –
M)/(AS + AM), where AM was activity during the mapping task and
S was activity during the strategy task.
To test for false-positive strategy effects due to trial-to-trial
hanges in stimuli or response, we examined data from the familiar
apping task, compared to the standard version of the strategy
ask. The monkeys performed the familiar mapping task so well
hat they were unlikely to use either strategy. We used a two-factor
NOVA, with factors Mapping (three levels) and Strategy (repeat-
tay, change-shift).
istological Analysis
ear the end of physiological data collection, we made electrolytic
esions (15 A for 10 s, anodal current) at two depths in selected
ocations. Afterw10 days, the animal was deeply anesthetized with
arbiturates, then perfused with buffered formaldehyde (3% by
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319weight) after steel pins were inserted at known chamber coordi-
nates. The brain was later removed, photographed, sectioned on a
freezing microtome at 40 m thickness, mounted on glass slides,
and stained for Nissl substance with thionin. We plotted the surface
projections of the recording sites by reference to the recovered
electrolytic lesions and the pin holes.
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data for this article can be found online at http://
www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/47/2/307/DC1/.
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